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Note
Caught Between Scalia and the Deep Blue Lake:
The Takings Clause and Transferable Development
Rights Programs
Paul Merwin*
Land use takings law has largely become an exercise in
line-drawing. Although the Supreme Court has attempted
numerous times to delineate the lawful scope of government
regulation under the Takings Clause,1 its attempts have gen-
erally produced constitutionally ambiguous lines. Despite its
many failures to clarify takings jurisprudence, the Court actu-
ally established an analytically firm line in Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, creating the "categorical takings" or
"takings per se" rule.2 The categorical takings rule states that
the government must compensate landowners if regulations
completely deprive landowners of the value of their land.3
While simple enough on its face, the categorical takings
rule does not always prove easy to apply. In particular, inno-
vative new land use tools have not lent themselves well to cur-
rent takings analyses. Because of their reliance on free-market
concepts, transferable development rights (TDR) programs, an
innovative land use regulation device, complicate the analysis
of whether a taking has occurred. As will be discussed at
length in this Note,4 TDR programs blur the bright line drawn
* J.D. 1998, University of Minnesota Law School.
1. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)
(establishing that a regulation that "goes too far" may violate the Takings
Clause).
2. 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
3. See id.
4. The term "transferable development rights," sometimes used inter-
changeably with "transferable development credits," refers generally to regu-
latory programs that involve the trading of property rights in a free market.
The actual implementation of programs may vary widely. See infra notes 128-
37 and accompanying text (discussing various purposes of and approaches toTDRs).
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in Lucas by confusing the issue of exactly what it is that the
line is supposed to divide.
The Supreme Court recently touched on a takings chal-
lenge to a TDR program in Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency.5 Although the Suitum decision concerned only a juris-
dictional ripeness issue,6 the division of the Coirt's opinion
raised questions about how a TDR scheme would fare under a
substantive takings analysis. Three Justices, in a concurring
opinion written by Justice Scalia, dissented to the portion of
the majority opinion that considered whether the plaintiff
should have to sell her development rights in order to ripen her
takings claim.7 Justice Scalia objected to this analysis because
it necessarily assumed that TDR programs could prevent a
taking,8 arguing instead that TDRs' single role lies in deter-
mining whether the property owner has received "just compen-
sation" after a taking has occurred, not whether the taking has
occurred in the first place.9 In other words, for Justice Scalia
and the concurring Justices, no imaginable TDR program could
constitutionally deflect a takings claim.
Evaluating takings claims against TDR programs depends
in part on how one characterizes TDRs. Proponents claim that
TDRs represent real property rights, and therefore constitute a
use of real property.10 TDR opponents, on the other hand, ar-
gue that development rights are not property rights at all, but
instead only represent arbitrary administrative variances from
land use restrictions." This confusion has left some govern-
5. 117 S. Ct. 1659 (1997). The Court overruled a Ninth Circuit opinion
which held that Suitum's claim was unripe because she had not exhausted her
administrative remedies by attempting to sell her development rights. See
Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 80 F.3d 359, 362-63 (9th Cir. 1996),
vacated, 117 S. Ct. 1659 (1997). The Supreme Court held that a market-based
determination of the availability and adequacy of development rights provided
a "final decision" upon which the Court could adjudicate. See Suitum, 117 S.
Ct. at 1662.
6. See Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1662.
7. See id. at 1670 (Scalia, J., concurring).
& See id.
9. See id.
10. See, e.g., Steven R. Levine, Comment, Environmental Interest Groups
and Land Regulation: Avoiding the Clutches of Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1179, 1210 (1994) (hypothesizing that
TDRs leave landowners an economically viable use of their land, thereby
avoiding a categorical takings claim under Lucas).
11. See, e.g., Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1670-71 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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ments that use TDR programs uncertain as to the constitu-
tional character of their regulatory activities. 12
This Note considers whether TDR programs could consti-
tutionally deflect a takings claim that would otherwise succeed
under Lucas. It assumes, for analytical purposes, a land use
regulation that would constitute a taking under Lucas but for
the existence of TDRs.13 Part I explores takings law with re-
spect to land use. Part I outlines the theory and application of
TDR programs. Part HI sketches the scarce treatment that the
Court has given TDR programs in takings contexts. Part IV
analyzes the effect of a TDR program on regulations that would
otherwise result in a taking. This Note concludes that TDR
programs may in fact prevent takings under a Lucas analysis.
I. REGULATORY TAKINGS
A. ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE TAKINGS CLAUSE
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
forbids the taking of private property "for public use, without
just compensation."14 In its original conception, this clause re-
quired compensation only when the government used its emi-
nent domain power to physically seize private lands for public
12. See, e.g., James E. Holloway & Donald C. Guy, Suitum v. Tahoe Re-
gional Planning Agency- Its Impact on the Final Decision Requirement and Its
Potential Implications for Lucas' Per Se Rule and the Role of TDRs in Takings
Analysis, 20 ZONING AND PLAN. L. REP. 65, 70 (1997) ("For municipalities and
state agencies that have used (and are still using) TDRs, the unsettled status
of TDRs in taking analysis leaves much uncertainty regarding the constitu-
tional validity of land use and other regulatory schemes."). Doubts have
manifested themselves in planning meetings and conferences in communities
that are considering new TDR programs. Interview with Jean Coleman,
Planner for Biko Associates, St. Paul, Minn. (Nov. 10, 1997).
Of course, the benefits of TDR programs extend beyond the deflection of
takings claims. TDR programs also achieve a number of other land use goals.
See infra notes 128-37 and accompanying text.
13. TDR programs come in a wide variety of forms, while takings law de-
pends heavily on specific facts.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. V. This clause is commonly known as the
"Takings Clause," the "Just Compensation Clause," or the "Eminent Domain
Clause." See Jennifer L. Bradshaw, Note, The Slippery Slope of Modern Tak-
ings Jurisprudence in New Jersey, 7 SETON HALL CoNsT. L.J. 433, 434 n.5
(1997).
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purposes. 15 Properly exercised government powers that did not
physically seize private property did not result in prohibited
takings. 16
The scope of the Clause was eventually expanded to in-
clude regulations that resulted in a physical invasion of prop-
erty, even where the government did not actually seize title. 7
The Court did not require compensation, however, when gov-
ernments restricted property rights in order to prevent a nox-
ious use, nuisance, or harm to the community, 18 because the
right to own property did not include the right to use it in a
way that harmed others.19 Governments also had the power to
15. See Good v. United States, 39 Fed. Cl. 81, 94-95 (1997) ("Early inter-
pretations of the Takings Clause limited its application to actual government
seizures of private property.").
A primary motivation for the Just Compensation Clause grew out of the
English concern, dating back to the Magna Carta, with the Crown's practice of
claiming possession of lands without compensating the original owner. Land-
owners had no absolute rights to use the land as they wished. Feudal notions
of the ownership of property held that the land was owned by the Crown, and
private individuals used the land only at the pleasure of the Crown. See Wil-
liam Michael Treanor, Note, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just
Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 697 (1985).
Therefore, the state had the sovereign power to abrogate those property
rights.
The feudal notions of property law remained a part of early American
law. See Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1081-82 (1993). Prop-
erty owners acknowledged that by submitting to government intrusion, they
were in fact contributing to the common good, including their own. See id
Benjamin Franklin stated that "Private Property... is a Creature of Society,
and is subject to the Calls of that Society, whenever its Necessities shall re-
quire it... its contributions therefore to the public Exigencies are.., to be
considered... the Return of an obligation previously received, or the Payment
of a Just Debt." Treanor, supra, at 700.
16. See Northern Transp. Co. v. City of Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 642 (1878).
17. See Pumpelly v. Green Bay & Mississippi Canal Co., 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 166, 180-81 (1871) (requiring compensation for flooding of private prop-
erty caused by dam). There is no de minimis or public need exception for
physical takings. Even the smallest physical intrusion for the greatest public
purpose requires compensation. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992); see also United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256,
265 (1946) (holding that a physical invasion of airspace constituted a compen-
sable taking).
18. See, e.g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 280-81 (1928) (upholding
law requiring destruction of infected red cedar trees that threatened nearby
apple orchards); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 412-14 (1915)
(upholding law prohibiting brickyard in residential area); see also Bradshaw,
supra note 14, at 441 (noting the Supreme Court's reasoning that an owner's
use of land may not injure the community).
19. See Hadacheck, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
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regulate land use as a means of preventing generalized harm
to the community, even if the regulation affected private prop-
erty rights that did not of themselves constitute harmful or
noxious uses.20 In other words, although a property owner suf-
fered economic loss caused by government regulatory activities,
regulations not requiring government to physically invade a
landowner's property historically were not deemed to consti-
tute takings.21
In 1922, the Court first recognized a "regulatory taking" in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.22 In Mahon, the Court noted
that a regulation that too greatly restricted the right to use
land resulted in a taking, even though no physical invasion
had taken place.23 Although maintaining that the government
could validly reduce the value of private property through
regulation,24 the Court held that a regulation that diminished
the value of property could simply "go[ I too far,"25 thus re-
quiring the government to compensate the injured landowner
for the property value diminution caused by its regulatory ac-
tivities.26 The Court has not offered a clear test for determin-
ing when a regulation goes "too far," preferring instead to
tackle takings issues largely on a case-by-case basis.27
B. RATIONALES BEHIND THE TAKINGS CLAUSE
The Court may have difficulty articulating a clear regula-
tory takings formula because of the variety of rationales it has
20. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 392 (1926)
("The harmless may sometimes be brought within the regulation or prohibi-
tion in order to abate or destroy the harmful.") (quoting City of Aurora v.
Burns, 149 N.E. 784 (111. 1925)).
21. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1014 (citing Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12
Wall.) 457 (1871)); see also Treanor, supra note 15, at 694 (discussing past
conceptions of the Just Compensation Clause).
22. 260 U.S. 393, 414-15 (1922).
23. See id. at 414-16.
24. See id. at 413.
25. See id. at 415.
26. See id. at 413 (stating that if the diminution in property value
reached a "certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be an ex-
ercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act").
27. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124
(1978) (explaining that, in the past, the Court generally eschewed any "set
formula" for determining how far is too far, preferring to "engag[e] in... es-
sentially ad hoc, factual inquiries").
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advanced for the Takings Clause.28 The first rationale, pre-
sented in Mahon, reasoned that eliminating the valuable use of
property may have the same effect as a physical appropria-
tion.29 In Mahon, Justice Holmes applied a balancing test that
measured the social utility of the valuable use of a property
and compared it to the social utility of regulating the use of
such property.30 Holmes noted with approval the "average
reciprocity of advantage" test, asserting that landowners do not
have a takings claim if they enjoy benefits from the regulation
that offset the burdens they must bear.31 The average reci-
procity of advantage principle still maintains its validity as a
rationale for zoning programs. 32
The harm-benefit rule,33 another early rationale offered for
the Court's regulatory takings jurisprudence, has not main-
tained such validity. The harm-benefit rule upheld regulations
that prevented a harm to the public, and invalidated regula-
tions designed to confer a public benefit.34 This rule attempted
to distinguish between the valid government purpose of pre-
venting noxious uses, and the invalid purpose of forcing one
landowner to bear the cost of a common benefit. Lucas did
away with the harm-benefit rule, characterizing the distinction
between preventing harm and promoting benefit as illusory, a
28. See DANIEL R. MANDELKER ET AL., FEDERAL LAND USE LAW:
LIMITATIONS, PROCEDURES, REMEDIES § 2A.03 (1998).
29. See Mahon, 260 U.S. at 414-15.
30. See id. at 414; MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 28, § 2A.04 (citing D.
MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 2.06 (3d ed. 1993)).
31. See Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415.
32. Zoning provides the most common example of a regulation that se-
cures an overall advantage for the community that benefits landowners, de-
spite the restrictions on the use of individual parcels. See MANDELKER ET AL.,
supra note 28, § 2A.03 ("While zoning at times reduces individual property
values, the burden is shared evenly, and it is reasonable to conclude that on
the whole the individual who is harmed by one aspect of the zoning will be
benefited by another.") (quoting Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 147 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting)).
33. Also known as the "noxious use" rule.
34. See Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning
Agency, 638 F. Supp. 126, 136 (D. Nev. 1986), vacated, 911 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir.
1990) (quoting E. FREUND, THE POLICE POWER § 511, at 546-47 (1904)):
It may be said that the state takes property by eminent domain be-
cause it is useful to the public, and under the police power because it
is harmful.... From this results the difference between the power of
eminent domain and the police power, that the former recognizes a
right to compensation, while the latter on principle does not.
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distinction "often in the eye of the beholder. 35 The Court rec-
ognized that, as a practical matter, it could not objectively tell
the difference between a regulation that prevented a harm and
one that conferred a benefit.36
Although the practical applications of the harm-benefit
rule have been abandoned, the reasons underlying its compo-
nent parts still shape takings jurisprudence. 37 The harm-
benefit rule involved two fundamental beliefs: (1) that a land-
owner could not lawfully use his property in a way that
harmed others; and (2) that the government should pay for
benefits that the entire community enjoys, rather than forcing
individual landowners to bear the entire cost. This rule com-
ports with the philosophy that the Takings Clause "was de-
signed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to
bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should
be borne by the public as a whole."38 Although this philosophy
is clear enough in theory, the Court has not developed a set
formula for determining when the economic costs of the public
good must be borne by the government, rather than borne dis-
proportionately by individuals. 39
35. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1024 (1992).
For example, one person may see an open space preservation rule as a pre-
vention of the harm arising from urban sprawl, while another may see it as
conferring the benefit of scenic views upon the community. Cf. id. at 1024-25.
Justice Scalia reconciled the Court's earlier use of the harm-benefit rule with
its demise in Lucas by explaining-
When it is understood that "prevention of harmful use" was
merely our early formulation of the police power justification neces-
sary to sustain (without compensation) any regulatory diminution in
value; and that the distinction between regulation that "prevents
harmful use" and that which "confers benefits" is difficult, if not im-
possible, to discern on an objective, value-free basis; it becomes self-
evident that noxious-use logic cannot serve as a touchstone to distin-
guish regulatory "tadngs'--which require compensation-from
regulatory deprivations that do not require compensation.
Id. at 1026; see also MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 28, § 2A.03.
36. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1026.
37. See MANDELKERETAL., supra note 28, § 2A.03.
38. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). The Court stated
a similar philosophy in Lucas, expressing a concern that private land should
not be pressed into public service. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1018.
39. The Court admits that it "quite simply, has been unable to develop
any 'set formula' for determining when justice and fairness' require that eco-
nomic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the government,
rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons." Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 103, 124 (1978) (citing Gold-
blatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962)).
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C. REGULATORY TAKi[NGS TESTS
1. Balancing Tests
Although many factors may affect a takings analysis, two
factors hold "particular significance":40 "the character of the
governmental action,"4 1 and the "economic impact of the regu-
lation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which
the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed
expectations."42 At its most basic level, the Takings Clause
prohibits regulations that either "do[ ] not substantially ad-
vance legitimate state interests . .. or den[y] an owner eco-
nomically viable use of his land."43 While many forms of regu-
lation lead to some diminishment in property values," not all
such regulation will result in a taking, because landowners do
not have a right to the "highest and best use" of their prop-
erty.45 Instead, the Court employs a balancing test between
the landowner's interest and the benefits produced by the
regulation. 46
Evaluating the purported benefits of regulation requires
an examination of the purposes behind the regulation and the
means chosen to effectuate that purpose. A regulation ad-
vances legitimate state interests if a "sufficient nexus" exists
between a valid governmental purpose and the means of regu-
lation applied to advance that purpose.47 A nexus exists if the
conditions imposed bear a "rough proportionality" to the pur-
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980), cited in Lucas, 505
U.S. at 1016.
44. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124-25 (providing examples of govern-
ment actions that may diminish economic value, such as taxation and other
forms of regulation).
45. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
46. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922)
("Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property
could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general
law.").
47. See Nollan v. California Coastal Conm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).
The "nexus" ensures that the regulation is constitutionally proper. Because
no property owner may use her land in a way that harms her neighbors, see
supra note 19 and accompanying text, it follows that the government may im-
pose restrictions to prevent property uses that harm the community. How-
ever, if the measures applied by the government do not further the claimed
state interest, this justification disappears. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
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poses of the regulation.48 Courts have generally allowed gov-
ernments a good deal of leeway in defining when a regulation
advances the public interest.4 9 The Court gives wide deference
to those regulations that promote "the health, safety, morals,
or general welfare,"50 and has upheld land use regulations even
if they "destroyed or adversely affected real property inter-
ests."51
The other prong of the balancing test, the property owner's
interest, is analyzed in terms of the economic impact of the
regulation. 2 Under Penn Central, the question turns mostly
on whether the owner may realize a reasonable use of or return
on the property,53 based on whether the owner is allowed a rea-
sonable return on distinct, investment-backed expectations. 54
The value that the owner retains, rather than the value that
the owner has lost, determines whether the owner receives a
reasonable return.55
Courts consider the entire regulatory climate in deter-
mining whether a landowner was justified in her expectation to
use the property in a certain way.56 The rationale for this rule,
in part, is that "one who invests in property with the knowl-
edge of a restraint assumes the risk of economic loss." 57 Even a
48. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) ("We think a
term such as 'rough proportionality' best encapsulates what we hold to be the
requirement of the Fifth Amendment.").
49. See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 388-90.
50. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 125.
5L Id.; see also Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928) (upholding
a land use regulation that substantially eliminated the economic value of
land). As the Court in Penn Central notes, zoning is the "classic example" of
regulation that can greatly diminish economic value but that generally does
not require compensation. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 125.
52. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 225, 260 (1980); Penn Central,
438 U.S. at 124.
53. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124-25.
54. See id. The expectations must be distinct and articulable, rather than
merely hypothetical or possible. The property owner is not entitled to com-
pensation for all possible uses of the property, but only those that he or she
might reasonably have expected to realize. See id.
55. See id. at 136.
56. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1013 (1984). The
Court in Monsanto declined to limit its inquiry into the regulatory climate to a
consideration of the law in effect at the time of purchase, holding that land-
owners speculating for profit bore the inherent risk of a change in regulatory
climate. See id.; see also Good v. United States, 39 Fed. Cl. 81, 109 (1997).
57. Good, 39 Fed. Cl. at 109 (citing Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United
States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1177 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
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clearly reasonable expectation of use does not mean a plaintiff
will prevail.5 8 Takings challenges have failed even where the
challenged regulation prohibited a previously allowed benefi-
cial use, even if there was substantial economic harm. 9 Ac-
cording to the Supreme Court, the state may make "a choice
between the preservation of one class of property and that of
[another] .60
2. Lucas Per Se Takings
Since the time of Penn Central and Agins, the Supreme
Court has expressly identified two circumstances in which a
single factor alone might determine the outcome of a takings
case:61 (1) denial of all economically viable use;62 and (2) physi-
cal invasions.63 Of these, the categorical takings rule has
played a significant role in TDR takings cases. Under Lucas,
regulations that effectively "den[y] all economically beneficial
or productive use of land" constitute per se takings.64 In Lucas,
the Supreme Court ruled that regardless of any legitimate gov-
ernmental interest, a regulation that removes all economically
viable use constitutes a taking.65 Once a categorical taking has
occurred, the government must compensate the landowner for
the full value of the property lost.66
The rationale behind the Lucas rule is relatively straight-
forward: as Justice Scalia put it in the majority opinion, a com-
plete denial of productive use amounts to the equivalent of a
physical taking, at least from the landowner's point of view.67
When the government denies all use without compensating the
58. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124-25.
59. See id.
60. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279 (1928). The Court also held that
"the State [did] not exceed its constitutional powers by deciding upon the de-
struction of one class of property [without compensation] in order to save an-
other which, in the judgment of the legislature, is of greater value to the pub-
lic." Id.
61. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015
(1992).
62. See id.
63. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,
441 (1982) (holding that a government regulation that authorizes a permanent
physical occupation of property so resembles the exercise of eminent domain
power that it alone constitutes a taking).
64 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
65. See id. at 1026-27.
66. See id. at 1019 n.8.
67. See id. at 1017.
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landowner, it is "less realistic to indulge [the Court's] usual as-
sumption that the legislature is simply 'adjusting the benefits
and burdens of economic life," 6S and more likely that "private
property is being pressed into some form of public service."69
Scalia's rationale eliminates the character of the govern-
ment action as a factor.70 In other words, no exercise of the po-
lice power is so compelling as to allow the complete deprivation
of property values without compensation. 71 The Lucas per se
rule does not extend, however, to regulations that merely make
explicit a common law nuisance restriction.7 2 The Court differ-
entiated these regulations by arguing that they only prohibit
uses that the property owner never had in the first place.
73
3. Unanswered Questions
Lucas necessarily requires a determination of the extent of
a regulation's economic impact upon a landowner.74 In deter-
mining economic impact, the Court has used a fractional com-
parison of the diminution resulting from the regulation over
68. Id. (quoting Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124). Other commentators
have explained this phenomenon in terms that fit well with the "reciprocity of
advantage" theory. See Joseph W. Trefzger, Efficient Compensation for Regu-
latory Takings: Some Thoughts Following the Lucas Ruling, 23 REAL EST. L.J.
191, 203-04 (1994). Landowners who are denied all use of their land receive
no reciprocal advantages from the regulation because they do not get to share
in the benefits of the regulation. See id. at 204.
69. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1018.
70. See Marilyn Phelan, The Current Status of Historical Preservation
Law in Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence: Has the Lucas "Missile" Disman-
tled Preservation Programs?, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 785, 813-14 (1995).
71. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029. Justice Scalia acknowledged that this
rule would in some cases create inequity between property owners who re-
ceived full compensation, and those who suffered a significant (but not total)
deprivation and received nothing. See id. at 1019 n.8.
72. See id. at 1029-30. Not all complete denials of specific uses result in a
taking. The state may prohibit uses that would not be permitted under
"background principles of nuisance and property law." For example, property
owners could never use their land in a way that resulted in a nuisance, so a
regulation forbidding nuisances cannot constitute a taking. Rather, such a
regulation merely makes explicit what was previously implicit in the law, by
expressly prohibiting a use that the property owner never had in the first
place. See id. Determining when a use is prohibited at common law requires
an examination of the underlying property law of the state in question. See
id.
73. See id.
74. See id. at 1016 n.7.
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the full unregulated value of the parcel.75 A simpler way to ex-
press this calculation is simply to subtract the value of the
property rights that the regulation removes from the total
value of the land. If the result is zero, a categorical taking has
resulted.7 6 Suppose that in Lucas, for example, the land in
question had a value of one million dollars if developed, and
zero value if left undeveloped.7 7 The regulation removed the
right to develop the property, and thus also removed the entire
million dollars' worth of value. If, on the other hand, the land
had possessed scenic value of $500,000 (even if undeveloped),
then prohibiting the development would not result in a total
diminution, because the owner still would have $500,000 worth
of use remaining in the property.
Unfortunately, the Court has not articulated a clear means
of calculating the full unregulated value of property.78 The
Court in Lucas expressly declined to define what property in-
terest constitutes the denominator of the takings equation.79
The property interests may arguably be divided in a number of
ways,80 including horizontally,8' vertically, 2 temporally,8 3 and
75. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,
497 (1987) ("[Olur test for regulatory taking requires us to compare the value
that has been taken from the property with the value that remains in the
property.. . ."); see also Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7.
76. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015 ("[We have found categorical treatment
appropriate... where regulation denies all ... productive use of the land.").
The use of a fractional analysis would result in a ratio or percentage of value
by which the regulation diminishes the value of the land. This suggests that
there is some percentage other than 100% that would be of significance. Since
Lucas only ruled on complete diminutions, this suggestion is incorrect.
77. Mr. Lucas actually paid $975,000 for the lots in question. See id. at
1006. The South Carolina Supreme Court found that Mr. Lucas had been de-
prived of $1,232,387.50. See id. at 1009.
78. See id. at 1016 n.7 ("Regrettably, the rhetorical force of our
'deprivation of all economically feasible use' rule does not make clear the
'property interest' against which the loss of value is to be measured."); see also
John E. Fee, Comment, Unearthing the Denominator in Regulatory Takings
Claims, 61 U. CH. L. REV. 1535, 1535-37 (1994).
79. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7.
80. See Fee, supra note 78, at 1537.
81. See id. at 1537 n.7 (describing horizontal interests as the most com-
mon way of dividing property rights, "meant to include any division into par-
cels, lots, or the like, as may be shown on a map").
82. See id. at 1537 n.8 (offering examples of vertical divisions of a parcel,
including air rights, surface rights, or subsurface rights).
83. See id. at 1537 n.9 (defining temporal divisions as "the division of
property interests into present and future estates").
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functionally. As a general rule, takings cases have not em-
braced these distinctions; parcels of property are generally de-
fined in terms of a cohesive whole, both in terms of physical
space and as a bundle of rights.85 Some flexibility exists when
defining property interests horizontally86 and temporally.
7
The Court has found less flexibility in other contexts, ruling
that a property owner may not divide land into separate verti-
cal 88 or functional interests in order to claim a taking.89 Even if
a regulation completely extinguishes an aspect of property
ownership, the test remains whether the regulation goes too
far with respect to the entire bundle.90 Thus, a regulation that
completely destroys the use of ten percent of the property is a
ten percent diminution of the whole, not a full taking of the ten
percent.
84. See id. at 1537 n.10 (describing fimctional divisions of property as in-
cluding easements, rights of way, and servitudes).
85. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,
497 (1987). The court noted:
"Taking" jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete
segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular
segment have been entirely abrogated. In deciding whether a par-
ticular governmental action has effected a taking, this Court focuses
rather both on the character of the action and on the nature of the in-
terference with rights in the parcel as a whole....
Id. (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130
(1978)). This generalization applies only to regulatory takings. A physical
appropriation of even a small portion of property results in a taking. See
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
86. Depending on the factual situation, the parcel may be divided into
separate physical sections. Some factors that may affect this decision include
the degree of continuity, the dates of acquisition, the extent to which the par-
cel has been treated as a single unit, and the extent to which a portion of the
property may enhance the value of other lands. See Fee, supra note 78, at
1547.
87. The Court has held that even a temporary taking is a compensable
taking. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los An-
geles, 482 U.S. 304, 317-20 (1987).
88. See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 500 (refusing to recognize a taking of sub-
surface mining rights for specific pillars of coal separately from the land as a
whole); Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130-31 (refusing to recognize a taking of the
air rights over a building without regard to the building below).
89. See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979) (refusing to recognize
a taking when a regulation prohibited sale of eagle feathers, because other
uses of the property remained).
90. See Andrus, 444 U.S. at 65-66 ("[Tlhe denial of one traditional prop-
erty right does not always amount to a taking. At least where an owner pos-
sesses a full 'bundle' of property rights, the destruction of one 'strand' of the
bundle is not a taking, because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety.").
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II. TRANSFERABLE DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS
TDR programs provide a regulatory mechanism for steer-
ing development away from sites that are not environmentally
well-suited for development to other, more appropriate sites.91
Professor John Costonis, in the seminal article on the modem
use of TDRs, described them as a means to protect a "low den-
sity resource" from "high density use."92 TDR programs do not
introduce radical new concepts into land use regulation. They
build on and use a number of previously existing land use
regulations. 93
A. A BRIEF HISTORY OF LAND USE REGULATIONS
The right to use property does not generally include the
right to use it to the detriment of other property owners.94 An-
cient common law, for example, first recognized the nuisance
doctrine, prohibiting noxious or disturbing uses that dimin-
ished the value of other lands.95 Although nuisance doctrine
adequately met community needs for centuries, the growth of
cities and suburbs brought conflicting uses into close proximity
and required greater land use controls. 96 As a result of the in-
creased conflict, the prevention of nuisances grew beyond a
private right of action into a legitimate exercise of the govern-
mental police power.97 Demands that governments act proac-
91. See LINCOLN INSTITUTE OF LAND POLICY & REGIONAL PLAN ASSO-
CIATION, TRANSFER OF DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS FOR BALANCED DEVELOPMENT
CONFERENCE REPORT 111 (1998).
92. John Costonis, Development Rights Transfer: An Exploratory Essay,
83 YALE L.J. 75 (1973). Other reasons to transfer development include a de-
sire to protect a valuable historic or scenic area in an essentially unchanged
form. See, e.g., Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 107.
93. See infra Part H.B.
94. See DAVID L. CALLIES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAND USE (2d
ed. 1994).
95. See DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW 98 (4th ed. 1997).
96. See 1 ANDERSON'S AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 1.03, at 7-8 (Kenneth
H. Young ed., 4th ed. 1996). Burgeoning urban areas provided an especially
sharp lesson in uncontrolled growth, as landowners competed to erect sky-
scrapers sooner than and larger than their neighbors in order to win the fight
for light and air. See EDWARD M. BASSETT, ZONING 315 (1922).
97. See BASSETT, supra note 96, at 319-20 (describing the growing accep-
tance of the use of the police power in land use regulation). The right of gov-
ernments to prevent nuisances extended even to the restriction of activities
that existed before communities "came to the nuisance." See, e.g., Hadacheck
v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (upholding regulation that prohibited brick-
making factories, as noxious uses, in residential areas).
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tively to control and channel the new urban growth led to the
development of modern land use regulation based on zoning.98
Zoning provisions may designate the lawful use of property
in a particular area, imposing restrictions such as lot size,
square footage limitations, height restrictions, and setback dis-
tances from roads.99 Early zoning ordinances envisioned a
standard growth model, a grid of proportionate square lots.100
This scheme worked well in dense urban areas, but lacked the
flexibility to control sprawling growth in suburban and rural
landscapes. 01 The "first wave" of land use revisions impacted
not only the types of uses allowed, but also the manner in
which those developments occurred.10 2 Some of these revisions,
such as comprehensive planning,10 3 floating zones, 0 4 cluster
98. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1922). The
ordinance at issue in Euclid focused on the protection of single-family resi-
dences from other encroaching uses such as industrial, commercial, or multi-
dwelling units. See id. at 379-80. Euclid held that restrictions on such uses
constituted a legitimate use of state power and was not a taking. See id. at
395.
99. See, e.g., id. at 379-83 (setting forth the details of one town's zoning
ordinance).
100. See id.
101. See James Poradek, Note, Putting the Use Back in Metropolitan
Land-Use Planning: Private Enforcement of Urban Sprawl Control Laws, 81
MINN. L. REV. 1343, 1348-49 (1997) ("By emphasizing low-density develop-
ment and a wide separation of uses, suburban zoning rejected schemes of
compact, integrated development and encouraged sprawling development.").
102. See Jerold S. Kayden, Market-Based Regulatory Approaches: A Com-
parative Discussion of Environmental and Land Use Techniques in the United
States, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 565, 568 (1992) (describing two waves of
zoning revisions).
103. See Poradek, supra note 101, at 1350-51.
104. Floating zone ordinances describe the characteristics that the zone
will have, but do not designate a location. The zone comes into being and at-
taches to an area when the governing board finds a situation that meets the
criteria in the ordinance. See CALLIES ET AL., supra note 94, at 69. While
there is some split, most jurisdictions allow floating zones as long as they are
not arbitrary or inconsistent with the comprehensive plan of the district. See,
e.g., Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown, 96 N.E.2d 731, 736 (N.Y. 1951)
(upholding a floating zone ordinance); Huff v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 133
A.2d 83, 92 (Md. 1957) (upholding a floating zone ordinance on grounds that it
was not "arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable"). But see Eves v. Zoning Bd.
of Adjustment, 164 A.2d 7, 11 (Pa. 1960) (holding a floating zone ordinance
invalid because it made land use impermissibly dependent upon landowner
applications). Care must be taken to differentiate floating zones from "spot
zoning," which impermissibly amends the zoning code in a limited area. See
CALLIES ETAL., supra note 94, at 69.
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development,10 5 or planned unit developments,10 6 attempt to
overcome the rigidity of "Euclidean zoning" in favor of flexible
standards.10 7
B. TRANSFERABLE DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS PROGRAMS
The "second wave" of land use revisions i08 introduced mar-
ket based regulatory methods into traditional command and
control schemes. 09 Market based regulation attempts to create
financial incentives for desirable behavior, rather than simply
outlawing undesirable behavior." 0 TDR programs replace or
supplement command and control zoning with a tradable
rights program that attempts to shift development into desired
patterns.'
105. Cluster developments attempt to cluster development closer together
than is usually permitted, allowing the consolidation of open space for other
purposes, such as parks or agriculture. See JOHN S. WILSON ET AL.,
COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING AND THE ENVIRONMENT: A MANUAL FOR
PLANNERS 173-74 (1979).
106. Planned unit developments are areas in which certain planning goals
are established but the exact implementation is flexible. The community may
set certain goals through the planning process and designate goals for growth.
For example, the community may designate that a certain percentage of
growth be dedicated to residential, commercial, or other uses. See CALLIES ET
AL., supra note 94, at 138.
107. See id.
108. See Kayden, supra note 102, at 568 (describing two waves of zoning
revisions).
109. See id. at 568-79 (describing several regulatory programs using mar-
ket approaches to achieve regulatory goals). Economic incentives have been
used to address a wide range of environmental and resource protection goals
within a regulatory scheme. See JOHN H. DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY AND
PRICES (1968); Richard B. Stewart, Economics, Environment, and the Limits
of Legal Control, 9 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 1 (1985); Law and Economics Sym-
posium: New Directions in Environmental Policy, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 153
(1988). A common example of market based regulation is in the area of air
pollution. The federal Clean Air Act sets a ceiling on pollution by selling a
number of "pollution credits." See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-7651o (1994). Industries
may buy credits at auction or may trade with other industries. See id. In this
way, the amount of pollution remains constant, but is distributed to the most
economically viable use. See Adam J. Rosenberg, Emissions Credit Futures
Contracts on the Chicago Board of Trade: Regional and Rational Challenges
to the Right to Pollute, 13 VA. ENvTL. L.J. 501, 503-10 (1994) (describing pol-
lution trading plan).
110. See Kayden, supra note 102, at 566 (discussing movement from com-
mand and control model to market based model of environmental regulation).
111. See id.
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TDR programs are based on the theory that some rights of
property ownership may be separated from others.11 2 Property
ownership is treated like a "bundle of sticks.""3 Property own-
ers have a set of rights that come with the ownership of land,
each of which can be separated from the other.1 4 Leasing is a
simple example of a property owner dividing his "sticks," in
which the owner retains the title of the land, but gives someone
else the right to possess and use the land.115 Another familiar
example is separating the ownership and use of the surface
land from the mining rights to minerals found below." 6 In
much the same way, the right to develop property in a certain
way may be separated from the right to possess the land.
The common law of property recognized this through
easements, which gave one person a non-possessory interest in
someone else's property." 7 In other words, the easement
holder had the right to use the property or restrict the use of it
even though he did not own the land itself."8 A modem, spe-
cialized form of easement called a conservation easement deals
particularly with restrictions on development for conservation
purposes." 9 Conservation easement holders purchase the right
to develop property in certain ways and remove that right from
the property. 2 0
112. See John J. Delaney et al., TDR Redux A Second Generation of Prac-
tical Legal Concerns, 15 URBAN LAW. 594, 596 (1983).
113. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,
435 (1982).
114. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 425 (noting that the rights to "possess, use
and dispose of' property are separate strands in the bundle).
115. See CALLIES ETAL., supra note 94, at 242.
116. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922)
(dealing with situation in which mining companies owned mineral rights to
underground coal separate from the property rights of the surface owners).
117. See CALLIES ET AL., supra note 94, at 244.
118. See id.
119. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 84C.01 (1996). The statute defines a conser-
vation easement as:
a non-possessory interest of a holder in real property imposing limi-
tations or affirmative obligations the purposes of which include re-
taining or protecting natural, scenic, or open-space values of real
property, assuring its availability for agricultural, forest, recreation,
or open-space use, protecting natural resources, maintaining or en-
hancing air or water quality, or preserving the historical, architec-
tural, archaeological, or cultural aspects of real property.
120. This concept has been used by governments and conservation groups
in purchase of development rights (PDR) programs, a precursor to TDRs. See
TOM DANIELS & DEBORAH BOWERs, HOLDING OUR GROUND: PROTECTING
AMERICA'S FARMS AND FARMLAND 145 (1997). PDR operates just as the name
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TDR programs carry the concept one step further. Be-
cause development rights may be removed from a property, it
seems logical that they may be added to a property. Rather
than simply buying the development rights from property own-
ers, governments establish a market through which property
owners may trade development rights amongst themselves.1 21
While the details of TDR programs vary, most have four basic
components. 122 First, they designate a preservation area, usu-
ally called the sending area, from which development is dis-
couraged or transferred. 23 Second, they establish a designated
growth area, known as the receiving area, to which develop-
ment rights are transferred. 124 Receiving areas are those in
which further development does not present a threat, and usu-
ally have already been developed to some degree.125 Landown-
ers in receiving areas may purchase development rights in or-
der to develop their property to a greater extent than would
normally be allowed under local land use regulations. 26 Third,
TDR programs have a pool of development rights that are le-
gally separated from the land in the sending area. 27 Finally,
TDR programs establish a procedure by which development
rights may be transferred from one location to another.
TDR programs vary in their specifics. Governments may
either create a voluntary incentive program 128 or a mandatory
suggests. The development rights of a piece of property, in the form of an
easement, are purchased and held separately from the ownership of the land
itself. See id. Subsequently, the landowner may not develop the land in a
way covered by the easement, because he literally has sold off the right to do
so. See id.
121. See Costonis, supra note 92, at 85-86 (describing the transfer of devel-
opment rights as "break[ing] the linkage between particular land and its de-
velopment potential by permitting the transfer of that potential").
122. See DANIELS & BOWERS, supra note 120, at 174.
123. See id; see also AMANDA JONES GOETTSEGEN, PLANNING FOR
TRANSFER OF DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS: A HANDBOOK FOR NEW JERSEY Mu-
NICIPALITIES 29-30 (1992) (identifying criteria to consider when designating
sending areas). Some of the uses of TDR programs have included preserva-
tion of historic buildings, farmland, open space, or coastlines.
124. See DANIELS & BOWERS, supra note 120, at 174.
125. See GOETTSEGEN, supra note 123, at 9-10 (identifying criteria to con-
sider when designating receiving areas).
126. See id. at 46. For example, if a landowner owned a lot that was zoned
for one residence, he could, by purchasing a development right, build two
residences on the lot.
127. See DANIELS & BOWERS, supra note 120, at 174.
128. Voluntary programs attempt to use financial incentives to preserve
land, and do not prohibit development in sending areas. See, e.g., N.J. STAT.
832 [Vol. 83:815
1999] TRANVSFERABLE DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS 833
program that prohibits development in sending areas. 129
Sending and receiving areas may be designated on a zoning or
a permit basis. 30 Zoning-based TDR programs designate broad
sending and receiving areas through the standard zoning proc-
ess, 131 and generally attempt to protect large tracts of open
space 32 or agricultural land.133 In contrast, permit-based pro-
grams do not identify broad sending areas, but identify charac-
teristics or criteria that determine whether a particular parcel
may be developed. 34
The exact form of development rights varies with each spe-
cific TDR program. For programs designed to preserve historic
sites, the property owner might receive air rights that may be
used to add size to a different building. 35 For programs that
protect residential or agricultural open space, the TDRs might
be measured simply in terms of a number of building units per
acre.1 36 The rights transferred can also be very complicated,
ANN. § 13:18A-30 (West 1991) ("Pinelands Development Credit Bank Act").
Voluntary programs allow property owners to sell development credits in re-
turn for placing a conservation easement on their land. See GOETTSEGEN, su-
pra note 123, at 105-07. Because voluntary programs do not prohibit devel-
opment, this Note focuses on the takings implications of mandatory TDR
programs.
129. See, e.g., MONTGOMiERY COUNTY, MD., CODE §§ 59-C-1.39, C-9.6 to C-
9.7 (1997).
130. See Robert A. Johnston & Mary E. Madison, From Landmarks to
Landscapes: A Review of Current Practices in the Transfer of Development
Rights, 63 J. Ai. PLAN. Ass'N 365, 366-67 (1997).
131. See id.
132. See, e.g., BOULDER COUNTY, COLO., LAND USE CODE art. 6 (1996).
133. See, e.g., MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE § 59-A-6.1 (1997).
134. The regulation at stake in Suitum provides a good example of a per-
mit-based TDR program. See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 117 S.
Ct. 1659, 1662-63 (1997). Calculating the amount of development allowed at a
site involves a complex process. The TRPA designates sending and receiving
areas through a complex site evaluation known as the Individual Parcel
Evaluation System (IPES) that uses scientific standards to determine the
ecological effect of development on a given parcel. See id. Sites with an IPES
score below a certain level may not be developed, but may transfer their de-
velopment rights to sites with a score above a certain level. See id.
135. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104,
112(1978).
136. See MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE § 59-C-9.6 (1997). Montgom-
ery County downzoned a sending area of 78,000 acres of agricultural land
from one building right per five acres to one per twenty-five acres. See
DANIELS & BOWERS, supra note 120, at 175. Then the county gave each prop-
erty owner in the sending area one TDR for every five acres owned. See id.
The county allowed landowners in the receiving areas to add one dwelling unit
per acre by purchasing TDRs. See id.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
especially in programs that use complex environmental analy-
ses to determine site uses. 137
TDR programs offer several advantages over traditional
land use tools. TDR programs allow governments to avoid im-
posing harsh regulations on community members. 138 This is
because TDR programs provide a method by which communi-
ties may spread the cost of regulation to the entire community,
and particularly to those individuals that benefit.139 In doing
so, TDR programs prevent "free riders," individuals who avoid
the costs of regulation but reap substantial benefits. 140 TDR
programs also avoid the direct outlay of public funds to acquire
easements or real estate. 141 By avoiding harsh regulation or
inequitable profit, TDR programs provide a tool for imple-
menting regulations that a community would otherwise lack
the political will to enact.142
As land use regulations, TDR programs have been sub-
jected to substantial judicial scrutiny. All land use programs,
TDRs included, must be enacted properly within the powers of
the government body.43 TDR programs in particular must
create development rights with some degree of certainty, sta-
bility, and proportionality to the original property rights that
the regulations restricted.'i
C. DEFINING TDRs IN LEGAL TERMS
The precise legal nature of TDRs has been the subject of
some debate. Some courts and commentators have treated
137. The TRPA Regional Plan, for example uses a very complex site
evaluation system to assign development rights. See Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at
1663.
138. See GOETTSEGEN, supra note 123, at 3.
139. See id. at 7.
140. See Trefzger, supra note 68, at 197.
141. See Delaney et al., supra note 112, at 596; DANIELS & BOWERS, supra
note 120, at 171-72.
142. See GOETTSEGEN, supra note 123, at 3 (arguing that the need for
TDRs stems from a lack of the political will to use traditional land use tools to
their full potential).
143. See West Montgomery County Citizens Ass'n v. Maryland-National
Capital Park & Planning Comm'n, 522 A.2d 1328, 1329 (Md. 1987) (striking
down a TDR program because it was enacted improperly through the planning
process, rather than through the properly delegated zoning process).
144. See Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 350 N.E.2d 381
(N.Y. 1976); see also Delaney et al., supra note 112, at 594.
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TDRs as real property interests.1 45 Others, most notably Jus-
tice Scalia, hold the belief that TDRs are arbitrary regulatory
variances, albeit valuable ones.146 One commentator has ar-
gued that some, but not all, TDR programs transfer true real
property interests.147 In this view, only those TDR programs
that explicitly and legally define the development rights as
true property interests, and protect them accordingly, actually
transfer real property interests.1 48
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has never directly ad-
dressed the issue of the validity and nature of TDRs the way
that Euclid determined the validity of zoning.1 49 Many courts
have seemed to accept without question or analysis the asser-
tion that TDRs are property interests, often citing to the
"bundle of sticks" analogy. 50 Other courts have taken the Su-
preme Court's dicta on TDRs in Penn Central'5' as ratification
of TDRs' status as property rights.1 52
145. See Richard J. Lazarus, Litigating Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency in the United States Supreme Court, 12 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 179
(1997).
146. See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 117 S. Ct. 1659, 1671-72
(Scalia, J., concurring); see also Lazarus, supra note 145, at 199-200.
147. See James M. Pedowitz, Transferable Development Rights, in AIR
RIGHTS, AIR SPACE, AND TRANSFERABLE DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS 33, 35-36 (PU
Real Estate Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 269, 1985)
(arguing that most development rights programs only transfer the "residual
post-zoning development potential," rather than the true development rights
that "consist of the unrestricted right to use and develop one's property").
148. See id. at 39-42. Pedowitz offers the Suffolk County, New York Plan
as an example of a program that transfers true property rights, because it op-
erates under a statute that recognizes the permissibility of severing true de-
velopment rights, and it offers protection from loss by adverse possession or
other law that may defeat the enforcement of an interest in real property. See
i.; see also James M. Pedowitz, Air Space and Air Rights, in AiR RIGHTs, AIR
SPACE, AND TRANSFERABLE DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS 57, 66-68 (PU Real Estate
Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 269, 1985) (citing N.Y. GEN.
MUN. LAW § 247(4)).
149. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
150. See, e.g., West Montgomery County Citizens Ass'n v. Maryland-
National Capital Park & Planning Comnm'n, 522 A.2d 1328, 1330 (Md. 1987)
(summarily explaining TDR programs using the "bundle of sticks" analogy).
151. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 137
(1977).
152 See, e.g., Good v. United States, 39 Fed. Cl. 81, 108 (1997) (citing Penn
Central, 438 U.S. at 137) (stating that TDRs represent uses of property that
should be considered when evaluating a takings claim); Gardner v. New Jer-
sey Pinelands Comm'n, 593 A.2d 251 (N.J. 1991) (upholding development re-
strictions against takings challenge based in part on availability of TDRs);
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Indirect evidence also exists to support the claim that de-
velopment rights are property interests. Members of the real
estate community treat them like property rights. 153 Realtors
have listed and sold development rights like any other real
property. They are appraised both as a part of their underly-
ing parcel and as individual units. The insurance industry has
also recognized TDRs as property, offering title insurance for
development rights.
I. THE SUPREME COURT ON TDRS AND TAKINGS
The Court has had little occasion to rule directly on the
validity of TDR programs as they relate to takings claims. Al-
though the Court has dealt with TDRs in a takings context on
at least two occasions, those cases have left the exact nature of
TDRs "unsettled."154 The Supreme Court touched on TDR pro-
grams in Penn Central, noting that TDRs "undoubtedly miti-
gate whatever financial burdens the law has imposed... and,
for that reason, are to be taken into account in considering the
impact of regulation."1 55 The word "mitigate" remains without
complete definition and does not answer the central question of
whether TDRs prevent a taking or merely compensate for one.
Penn Central does not provide a clear answer to this ques-
tion; in fact, the language in the case is contradictory on the is-
sue.156 At one point the Court notes explicitly that if there has
been a taking, it would then consider "whether the transferable
City of Hollywood v. Hollywood, Inc., 432 So. 2d 1332, 1338 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983) (citing Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 137).
153. See, e.g., Gordon v. Flamingo Holding Partnership, 624 So. 2d 294,
297 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that the removal of development rights
from a property will impair an interest in collateral); Patricia Grace Hammes,
Development Agreements: The Intersection of Real Estate Finance and Land
Use Controls, 23 U. BALT. L. REV. 119, 164 (1993) (comparing TDRs to devel-
opment agreements, stating that "[a] vested right in development represents
one of the key sticks in the bundle that constitutes real property").
154. See Holloway & Guy, supra note 12, at 69.
155. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 137. The Court in Penn Central, however,
declined to rule on the validity of the TDR scheme standing alone. See id. at
122.
156. See Suitum v. Tahoe Regl Planning Agency, 117 S. Ct. 1659, 1671(1997) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Whereas once there is a taking, the Constitu-
tion requires just (i.e. full) compensation, a regulatory taking generally does
not occur so long as the land retains substantial (albeit not its full) value.")
(citations omitted); see also Joseph D. Stinson, Transferring Development
Rights: Purpose, Problems, and Prospects in New York, 17 PACE L. REV. 319,
333 (1996).
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development rights . . .constitute 'just compensation' within
the meaning of the Fifth Amendment."157 This clearly places
TDRs on the compensation side of the line. Later in the opin-
ion, however, the court seems to confuse the issue by referring
to TDRs as compensation, but still considering them when de-
termining the impact of the regulation.15 8 Determining the im-
pact of the regulation, the Court notes, goes toward determin-
ing if there has been a taking in the first place.15 9 Then-Justice
Rehnquist, in his dissenting opinion in Penn Central, left no
doubt that he considered TDRs relevant to compensation
only. 60 He noted that he would consider TDRs as relevant to
the inquiry only if they "constitute a 'full and perfect equiva-
lent for the property taken." 161
The most recent attempt to apply takings law to a TDR
program concerned regulations in the Lake Tahoe basin, an
area long prized for its natural beauty.162 In recent decades,
the Tahoe area has grown greatly, and so has the strain on its
delicate ecosystem. 63 The aggregate effect of various human
activities threaten the environmental quality of the whole ba-
sin. 64 Hoping to preserve the quality of the lake, Congress di-
rected the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA)165 to
amend its comprehensive land use plan to minimize the ad-
verse effects of increasing population. 66 The plan focused, in
157. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 122. Since the court found that a taking
had not occurred, it did not put this part of the test into practice.
158. See id. at 137.
159. See id. at 124-25.
160. See id. at 138 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 152; see also Stinson, supra note 156, at 333.
162. See Carl R. Pagter & Cameron W. Wolfe, Jr., Lake Tahoe: The Future
of a National Asset-Land Use, Water, and Pollution, 52 CAL. L. REV. 563, 564
(1964).
163. See Respondent's Brief at 2-4, Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning
Agency, 117 S. Ct. 1659 (1997) (No. 96-243).
164. A combination of factors contributed to the degradation of the envi-
ronmental quality of the area, including water use, disposal, and runoff. See
id.
165. See Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1662-63. The agency was created through
interstate compact by California and Nevada and approved by Congress in
1969. See Pub. L. No. 91-148, 83 Stat. 360 (1969).
166. In 1980 Congress revised the compact to require the TRPA to pre-
serve the environmental and recreational qualities of the region through the
adoption of a binding regional plan that barred any development that failed to
contribute to attaining or maintaining specific "environmental threshold car-
rying capacities." See Pub. L. No. 96-551, 94 Stat. 3233 (1980). The regional
plan, as later amended in 1984 and 1987, attempts to protect the delicate wa-
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part, on reducing human impacts in stream environment zones
(SEZs),167 which play an essential role in water flow and filtra-
tion, maintaining the area's delicate hydrological balance.1 68
Bernadine Suitum bought a parcel of land in the Tahoe
basin in 1972,169 but when she applied for a building permit in
1989, the TRPA determined that the lot was located entirely
within an SEZ, and forbade any "additional land coverage or
other permanent land disturbance" on the lot.170 Suitum sued,
claiming that the regulation denied her all economically feasi-
ble use of her property and resulted in a categorical taking un-
der Lucas.171 In many ways, Suitum's claim parallels the facts
of Lucas, in that both cases involved a restriction on develop-
ment in order to prevent environmental harm.172
One major fact differentiates Suitum's claim from that in
Lucas: although prohibited from developing her property, the
TRPA's comprehensive plan allowed Suitum to sell the unused
development rights from her property.173 Suitum refused to
participate in the program, calling it a "sham" and claiming
ter quality of the lake by restricting residential, commercial, and tourist uses
in the drainage area. See Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1662-63.
167. See Respondent's Brief at 25aa, Suitum (No 96-243).
168. The clarity of the lake is due to the very low level of sediment and nu-
trients in the water. This results from the relatively small land surface area
of the lake's drainage basin and the filtering effect of the SEZs. See Respon-
dent's Brief at 2, Suitum (No. 96-243).
169. See Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1660.
170. The TRPA evaluates sites using an Individual Parcel Evaluation Sys-
tem (IPES). See id- at 1662. IPES assessments consider several factors, in-
cluding relative erosion hazard, runoff potential, access, the presence of
stream environment zones, the condition of watershed, ability to revegetate,
the need for water quality improvements in the vicinity, and the distance from
Lake Tahoe. See IPES-Individual Parcel Evaluation System (visited Nov. 4,
1998) <http://www.ceres.ca.gov/trpa/ipes.html>. Suitum received the lowest
possible IPES score (zero), placing her property in the worst possible category
for development. See Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1662-63.
171. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
172. In Lucas, the South Carolina Coastal Council, in order to prevent
coastal damage and erosion, established a baseline along the beach beyond
which construction of residences was prohibited. As a result, no other eco-
nomically viable use of the property remained. See id. at 1008-09.
173. See Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1660. The program consisted of three mar-
ketable credits that Suitum could sell. One is a residential allocation, which
is simply a permit to construct a residence. The second is a residential devel-
opment right, the right to build a residence on a parcel of land. See Respon-
dent's Brief at 8, Suitum (No. 96-243). Suitum could also transfer her poten-
tial land coverage, the amount of impermeable surface allowed on a particular
lot. See id
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that the development rights did not provide her a constitution-
ally sufficient use that could prevent a taking.174
The TRPA countered by arguing that Suitum had not rip-
ened her claim because she had not attempted to sell the de-
velopment rights she was given, and could not, therefore,
maintain that they had no value.17" As a result, the TRPA
could not reach a "final decision" as to how she could use her
property, nor could the Court know the full economic impact of
the regulation on her investment-backed expectations for her
property.176 The Court held that sufficient methods of valuat-
ing the TDRs existed to allow a court to decide upon the legal-
ity of the regulation. 177 It thus found her claim ripe for review
and remanded the case for further proceedings.
Suitum does not provide explicit guidance as to the nature
of TDRs, but does avoid the "mitigation" contradiction found in
Penn Central.178 Although refusing to deal with the substan-
tive issues directly,179 the Court implicitly treated the TDRs'
valuation as relevant to the determination of whether a taking
had occurred.18 0 By even bothering to decide that Suitum's
claim was ripe because the market could determine the value
of her TDRs, the Court seemed to believe that TDRs were rele-
vant,181 a point with which Justice Scalia and the concurring
Justices disagreed.
174 See Petitioner's Brief at 20-21, Suitum (No. 96-243).
175. See Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1664.
176. See id.
177. See id. at 1668-69. The TRPA's expert real estate appraiser submit-
ted an affidavit stating that the land could be sold for $35,000, and that devel-
opment rights at similar parcels had sold for prices ranging from $18,500 to
$32,000. See Respondent's Brief at 140-43, Suitum (No. 96-243).
178. The Court specifically avoided ruling on this issue:
While the pleadings raise issues about the significance of the TDRs
both to the claim that a taking has occurred and to the constitutional
requirement ofjust compensation, we have no occasion to decide, and
we do not decide, whether or not these TDRs may be considered in
deciding the issue of whether there has been a taking in this case, as
opposed to the issue of whether just compensation has been afforded
for such a taking.
Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1662.
179. See supra note 178.
180. See Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1668-70.
181. Chief Justice Rehnquist's position is especially interesting. By not
joining in Justice Scalia's concurrence, he essentially abandoned the position
taken in his Penn Central dissent. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New
York, 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978); see also supra notes 160-61 and accompanying
text.
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Justice Scalia would have held Suitum's claim ripe for re-
view without regard to the TDRs, because he did not feel that
TDRs affected the issue of whether a taking had occurred.18 2
Justice Scalia believed that the TDRs represented only a
regulatory variance, not an actual use of or interest in prop-
erty.183 Although he agreed that the TDRs had value, he con-
sidered them monetary compensation at best, or a new right
exchanged for the taking.8 4 He argued that because the ques-
tion of whether a regulation "goes too far" 85 only refers to the
extent to which the land is restricted, not the extent to which
the landowner is compensated, TDRs do not affect the deter-
mination of whether a taking occurred. 86 Instead, Justice
Scalia argued, TDRs merely represent compensation for a
taking-in other words, he saw no constitutional distinction
between a property owner who receives payment from the gov-
ernment in an eminent domain action, and one who receives
payment through the sale of development rights the govern-
ment has granted.187
IV. TDR PROGRAMS PASS TAKINGS TESTS
A. APPLYING CURRENT TAKINGS LAW TO TDR PROGRAMS
1. TDR Programs Sidestep the Lucas Categorical Takings
Test
The first step in analyzing a TDR program in light of a
takings claim requires determining whether the program falls
under the categorical takings rule of Lucas. The test in Lucas
boils down to the question of whether the regulation removes
one-hundred percent of the value of the property. If so, the
analysis ends, and the regulation must be invalidated. 88
Unfortunately, the Court's analysis in Lucas does not point
to a clear resolution of the argument, raised by Justice Scalia in
182. See Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1670 (Scalia, J., concurring).
183. See id. at 1671.
184. See id.
185. Id.
186. See id.
187. See id.
188. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016
(1992).
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Suitum, that TDRs do not represent a use of property.18 9 The
Court in Lucas declined to decide exactly which property inter-
ests constituted the relevant parcel of property.190 Because the
Court defines property interests according to their usefulness,
this question, slightly rephrased, makes up the crux of Justice
Scalia's argument in Suitum: do the development rights repre-
sent a use of the property?'91
Several mechanical arguments support the assertion that
TDRs are real property interests. The simplest of these is the
assertion that the right to develop constitutes a stick in the
bundle of property rights. 92 While the bundle analogy may il-
lustrate that property interests are divisible, 193 it has never
fully defined exactly what rights constitute a full bundle 94 and
to what extent they may be divided. 95 However a significant
number of courts, legislators, and commentators have accepted
and applied the analogy to TDRs.' 96 The sheer ease with which
a large portion of the legal community has accepted the notion
that development rights constitute a severable stick in the
bundle supports the idea that TDRs are property rights. At
the very least, such widespread acceptance shows that such a
conclusion is neither shocking nor absurd.
Ironically, private property rights advocates themselves
have asserted that denying the right to develop constitutes the
denial of a property right, even if other uses remain in the
property. The plaintiffs in Penn Central, for example, argued
that a restriction from building a skyscraper onto Grand Cen-
tral terminal denied a property right, although plaintiffs re-
tained several profitable uses from the terminal without fur-
ther improvement. 97 It would be disingenuous to argue that
189. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
19L See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
194. The Court has, however, determined that some interests do not con-
stitute part of the bundle of property rights. See supra notes 18-19 and ac-
companying text (providing examples of potential property uses that do not
rise to the level of property rights).
195. One may presume that the infinite possibilities for the development of
land do not all constitute legally cognizable interests.
196. See supra notes 145, 150-53 and accompanying text.
197. The fact that the Penn Central plaintiffs lost does not mean that they
were wrong about the right to develop constituting a property right. The
Court recognized it as a property right, but held that it was an acceptable
deprivation. The Court's balancing test weighs the governmental interest
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the right to develop constitutes a real property right if it is the
only use denied, but not when it stands alone.
Another argument is that development rights have been
treated as property interests for other purposes. For example,
the real estate and insurance industries have treated them as
property, placing liens on TDRs and also offering title insur-
ance for them. Development rights have been taxed as prop-
erty, and banks have formed security interests in them. Devel-
opment rights also bear similarity toward options to buy, which
may constitute personal property interests.
The "use" that development rights provide is not dimin-
ished merely because it is an economic use rather than a
physical use. In weighing takings claims, the courts quickly
interpret "use" to mean "value."'9 8 The Supreme Court's tak-
ings jurisprudence measures the economic deprivation a prop-
erty owner suffers against that owner's reasonable investment-
backed expectations. 9 9 After all, "what is the land but the
profits thereof?"2 00 TDRs offer an economic use for property by
providing a vehicle for profit.201
Justice Scalia based his decision on the belief that assign-
ing a development right that a property owner may redeem for
cash is no different than the government offering monetary
compensation for a taking. 02 This might be the case if the gov-
ernment were conferring a right unrelated to the property in-
terest and the real estate market. This is not the case, how-
ever, with TDRs, which give property owners a stake in the
free market valuation of the worth of the development transfer
out of their property.203 TDRs provide economic value by al-
lowing the property owner to "use" the property as a means of
obtaining profit on the free market-thereby preventing a
taking from ever occurring.204
against the value the landowner retains, not the extent to which potential
value has been lost. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 55-56.
199. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
200. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017
(1992) (quoting 1 E. COKE, INSTITUTES ch. 1, § 1 (1st Am. Ed. 1812).
201. Suitum, for example, could have sold her property and development
rights for up to an estimated sum of $67,000. See supra note 177.
202. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
204. See Levine, supra note 10.
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Admittedly, the profit a landowner may realize through
the sale of development rights may be considerably less than if
the landowner had been allowed to develop the land as he saw
fit.205 However, the Takings Clause does not require that the
landowner retain the "highest and best use," but only a rea-
sonable use of the property.20 6 At any rate, the quantity of use
allowed does not enter into the question of whether to apply
Lucas, under its own terms. Under Lucas, it is enough to say
that the landowner is left with some viable use of the prop-
erty.207 If TDRs constitute any sort of use at all, then Lucas
does not apply.20 8
2. Penn Central
If Lucas does not apply, the Court would then perform a
Penn Central balancing test.209 Most TDR programs should
pass such a balancing test, because they advance substantial
state interests210 while finding a unique way to reduce the bur-
dens on individual landowners.211
Governments generally select TDR programs over other
land use regulatory devices because a special public interest
exists or a problem has defied other solutions. 212 TDR pro-
grams across the country have achieved numerous worthy
goals, including the preservation of natural resources, agricul-
tural land, historic buildings, or scenic areas. The justifica-
tions for TDR programs, therefore, go even beyond the mere
"general welfare" that basic land use regulation seeks to serve,
and address particularly pressing and thorny community con-
cerns. TDR programs should therefore pass a takings balanc-
ing test under Penn Central.213
205. For example, Suitum would have to forego the indeterminate but un-
doubtedly substantial value of a Lake Tahoe home in exchange for an esti-
mated maximum of $67,000 for her development rights. See supra note 177.
206. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
209. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
210. See supra note 46 and accompanying text
211. See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
212. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 40-60 and accompanying text (describing the Penn
Central balancing test).
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B. AN ALTERNATIVE VIEw: NOT APPLYING CURRENT TAKINGS
LAW TO TDR PROGRAMS
The question of whether TDRs comprise a property inter-
est and, therefore, a use under Lucas need not be the entirety
of a takings analysis. Even if viewed only as a regulatory vari-
ance,214 a well-drawn TDR program may prevent a taking, even
if regulations do prohibit all development on a parcel of land.
To reach this conclusion, one must step outside of traditional
takings law and evaluate TDRs in light of the purposes of the
Takings Clause.
As an initial matter, TDR programs alleviate Justice
Scalia's fears that private land is being pressed into public
service. 215 Within the context of a systematic and comprehen-
sive land use scheme, fears of disproportionately burdening a
private individual have less basis.216 If this is in fact Justice
Scalia's concern, then a program that distributes the cost of
community benefits across the private sector should dispel it.
Lucas approved of regulations that merely "adjust[ ] the
burdens and benefits of everyday life," noting that the Court
usually "indulges" in the "assumption" that most regulations
do so. 217 The Court found this assumption difficult to make in
the case of a total deprivation of use.2 18 If the Court is looking
to determine whether a regulation shifts the "benefits and bur-
dens of everyday life," it need not always depend upon a mere
assumption. TDR programs, by their nature, shift the benefits
and burdens of land use regulation. Perhaps more impor-
tantly, TDR programs shift the benefits and burdens more eq-
uitably than traditional land use regulations.219
At times, traditional land use regulations may operate like
a sort of lottery for landowners. Some may find their property
restricted by regulation that benefits the entire community,
while others profit from extensive development and enjoy the
benefits of the land use regulation. For example, if a scenic
area is regulated to keep development to a minimum, land-
owners in that area must forego the opportunity to develop the
land at a profit. Owners of adjoining land, however, may de-
214. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
215. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
217. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
218. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
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velop their property at a premium because of its proximity to
the scenic area. TDR programs temper this sort of inequity-
in the above case, for example, a TDR program would require
landowners who wished to develop their property to purchase
development rights from the restricted landowners.220 This al-
lows the community to regulate the development, while shift-
ing some of the costs of the regulation to the benefited parties
and avoiding the free-rider problem.2
21
TDR programs fulfill the purposes of the Takings Clause
more thoroughly than the narrow application of Lucas does, by
avoiding the all-or-nothing results that Lucas creates.
222 Jus-
tice Scalia in Lucas admitted that the decision was unfair to
those landowners who suffered less than one-hundred percent
diminution in value.22 3 A landowner who suffers a one-
hundred percent loss of the use of his land receives one-
hundred percent compensation, while a landowner who suffers
a ninety-five percent loss receives nothing.22 4 TDR programs
provide a way to alleviate this inequity.
Professor John Costonis once described takings jurispru-
dence as a debate between two opposing groups: (1) the "police
power enthusiasts," who favor active government regulation
and oppose compensating regulated property owners;225 and (2)
"private marketeers," who favor a laissez-faire attitude toward
government regulation and believe that property owners who
are restricted by a regulation should be compensated.22 6 Pro-
fessor Costonis argued that this polarity would force govern-
ment action to extremes, either imposing harsh, uncompen-
sated regulation on landowners, or paying landowners
complete compensation for regulation through the eminent
domain power.227 Professor Costonis proved an able predictor,
and the Lucas categorical rule today imposes an even greater
extreme than he envisioned at that time.228 As a solution to
220. See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
221. See supra note 140 and accompanying text. TDRs alleviate, to some
extent, the problem of those landowners who have been regulated off of their
land.
222. See supra note 71.
223. See supra note 71.
224 See supra note 71.
225. See John Costonis, Fair Compensation and the Accommodation
Power, 75 COLUM. L REV. 1021 (1975).
226. See id. at 1024-27.
227. See id. at 1038.
228. See supra note 71.
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this dichotomy, Professor Costonis suggested an "accom-
modation" power, which envisioned land use regulation along a
spectrum of intensity.229
The application of an accommodation power compromises
between the opposite poles of harsh governmental regulations
that heavily burden landowners with no compensation and the
need to completely compensate landowners for valid regula-
tion.230 TDR programs have provided a middle ground, and il-
lustrate the viability and desirability of an accommodation
power. TDR programs provide a means to balance the costs
and benefits of regulation more equitably among all parties.
Under Lucas, landowners in a regulated area fall into
three groups. First, landowners whose right to use their prop-
erty is completely restricted receive full compensation for their
land. Second, landowners who are heavily affected by a regula-
tion, but retain some use, receive nothing. Finally, those who
own adjoining land reap the benefits of the regulation and suf-
fer no detriment. All three groups pay for the regulation
equally, because the costs of the regulation must come from
general government revenues (taxes).
TDR programs blur the harsh distinctions found in the
above scenario. In a TDR program, both of the first two groups
would receive some compensation, in proportion to the degree
to which the regulation reduced the value of their land and
forced them to sell development rights.231 The exact amount of
compensation would depend on the market for development in
the area.232 The costs of the regulation would fall upon those
adjoining landowners who benefited from the regulation, who
would have to purchase development rights to develop their
property further.2 33
The theory of the Tahoe land use plan shows the potential
benefits offered by TDRs. Lake Tahoe was being loved to
death.234 As more people crowded in to enjoy the splendor of
the lake, the lake lost that splendor.235 While Suitum may
have wanted a home on beautiful Lake Tahoe, her home would
229. See Costonis, supra note 225, at 1049-55.
230. See id
231. See supra notes 123-27 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 128-27 and accompanying text.
233. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
234 See supra notes 162-64 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 162-64 and accompanying text.
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have contributed to the decline of the lake.2 36 Eventually, such
homeowners would lose the very reason they wanted to live
there in the first place.
The TRPA faced a dilemma. It became clear that certain
development in stream environment zones had to be restricted.
Yet, such restrictions would have harsh effects on landowners
like Suitum. As a result, the TRPA could be forced to buy out
landowners like Suitum, an expensive proposition in Lake Ta-
hoe. The beneficiaries would be adjoining landowners, who
would enjoy increased property values as a result of the regula-
tion, but would bear none of the costs.
The TDR program provides an equitable compromise, and
could distribute the burden of the regulation to other landown-
ers. Granted, Suitum would not get to build a house on her
property. But the TRPA did not create the environmental cri-
sis that led to the regulation.23 7 It did not arbitrarily single out
Suitum for harsh regulation, it merely tried to find the fairest
method to respond to the demands of the natural environment.
It may be unfortunate when nature requires human beings to
forego their desires, but at least Suitum was not forced to bear
the burden of the regulation alone.
Under Justice Scalia's formulation, the TRPA would face
two equally unpalatable options: abandon the regulation, or
buy out every landowner in an SEZ. Abandoning the regula-
tions would doom the lake to a slow decay.238 Attempting to
buy out all SEZ properties would likely have the same effect.
Given the property values in the Tahoe area, the agency could
hardly afford the price of this option, and would have to aban-
don or sharply curtail the regulation. If that were to happen,
everyone would lose.
CONCLUSION
TDR programs may meet the constitutional requirements
of the Takings Clause in one of two ways. First, they pass the
takings analyses that the Court has currently put in place.
TDR programs avoid the categorical takings rule of Lucas by
providing landowners with an economic use of property.239
TDR programs meet the goals of the Takings Clause, and avoid
236. See supra notes 162-64 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 162-64 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 164-68.
239. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
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many of the evils that takings law seeks to prevent.240 TDR
programs also pass a balancing test under Penn Central, pro-
viding benefits to the community that outweigh the economic
burden on regulated landowners.241 This is especially true be-
cause the economic burden is distributed among the benefici-
aries of the regulation.2 42 TDR programs may also find consti-
tutional acceptance by forcing a reconciliation of the extremes
found in takings law today. Market-based regulations like
TDR programs avoid the twin evils of uncompensated oppres-
sive regulation and forced public compensation in order to
achieve valid and pressing community goals.
The innovation represented by TDR regulations benefits
both regulators and landowners. Well-drafted TDR programs
deserve praise for presenting difficult compromises to thorny
land use problems. TDRs do not, however, fit neatly within the
boxes that current takings law has provided. Forcing such an
outdated and extreme analysis will only serve to stifle regula-
tory innovation.
240. See supra notes 217-19 and accompanying text.
241. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 211, 219 and accompanying text.
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